Banks "hiding the salami"

By RODERICK M. HILLS, HARVEY L. PITT
AND DAVID S. RUDER

Independent accounting standards have helped make American capital markets the best in the world. In making financial decisions, investors rely heavily upon the integrity of corporate financial reports prepared in accordance with accounting standards established by the independent Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). That board is supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Now, the Obama administration is on the verge of transferring accounting standards responsibility from the SEC to a systemic risk regulator. Such a radical move would have extremely negative consequences for our capital markets.

Although there may be good reasons for establishing different regulatory capital standards for financial services firms, those reasons cannot justify dispensing with the FASB's accounting standards. Acting in accord with powers given to it by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC has formally recognized the FASB as the definitive standard-setting body, capable of "improving the accuracy and effectiveness of financial reporting and the protection of investors."

The SEC treats accounting standards adopted by the board as authoritative. If the SEC has concerns about, or disagrees with, accounting standards promulgated by the FASB, it can refuse to give them deference.

Today, the American Bankers Association, on behalf of many commercial banks, is seeking to prevent disclosure of the fair value of the financial instruments they own. It is attempting to persuade Congress that the safety and soundness of the banking system will be protected if a systemic risk regulator can prescribe accounting disclosures for financial companies.

The government shouldn't follow their advice. This change might well interfere with efforts by financial firms to raise capital. Investors will assume that the accounting standards they employ are designed to mask risks.

As former chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission, we are well aware of the long-held desire of commercial interests to avoid fully disclosing their finances. In the 1990s, business interests opposed publicly disclosing their post-employment pension and health obligations. Similarly, in 2000, efforts were made to prevent the FASB from eliminating distortions that inflated the balance sheet values of newly merged companies, because its elimination might make balance sheets look less favorable to potential investors.

In 1994, the FASB considered requiring companies to reflect the current value of their outstanding stock options. After intense lobbying from certain business interests and pressure from Congress, the FASB decided not to require use of the fair value method. In 2004, when the FASB finally mandated it for valuing stock options, certain U.S. business opponents continued to lobby Congress to overturn that decision.

During times of financial distress, there is always pressure to change accounting standards in order to inflate the value of assets. Under certain circumstances, there may be a legitimate need to recognize that stresses on large financial institutions may threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system. Banking regulators can ease such stresses by reducing regulatory capital requirements. But it would be a mistake to adopt legislation that would allow financial-services firms to hide their true financial positions from investors.

If changes in accounting standards are used to bury significant risks for one purpose, it will not be long before other purposes are asserted to permit further deviations. This is a dangerous path that will only hurt investors and our capital markets.
—Messrs. Hills, Pitt and Ruder are former chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission.